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ABSTRACT: Contributing to an understanding of the true virtues of argumentation, this paper 
sketches and exemplifies a theoretically reasoned but simple typology of argumentative vices or 
‘malpractices’ that are rampant in political debate in modern democracies. The typology reflects, in 
negative, a set of argumentative norms, thus making a bid for something that civic instruction might 
profitably teach students at all levels about deliberative democracy.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
In order to highlight the true virtues of public argumentation, I will sketch and 
exemplify a theoretically reasoned but simple typology of argumentative vices that 
are rampant in political debate in modern democracies.  
The typology is based on reflections on what functions political debate might 
have and ought to have in a modern mediated democracy. This functional 
understanding underlies a view of what ‘virtuous’ political argumentation might be 
like, which again implies the proposed typology of vices. I see such an approach as 
essentially rhetorical, while integrating concepts and insights from, primarily, 
Informal Logic. I further draw on insights from several practical philosophers and 
political theorists. 
My typology, I suggest, could be a useful tool not only for academic observers 
of political debate but also for political reporters, commentators and journalists 
acting as interviewers or moderators in debates; with it, they might better identify 
and respond to the argumentative vices they meet. Moreover, I propose the theory, 
the set of norms, and the typology as a bid for something that civic instruction might 
profitably try to teach students at all levels about deliberative democracy – or, with 
a term I prefer, Rhetorical Citizenship (Kock & Villadsen, 2012).  
 
2. WHAT CITIZENS NEED 
 
I believe we should assess the virtues of political argumentation from the point of 
view of citizens. In contrast, political commentators and ‘pundits’ tend to primarily 
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estimate or second-guess how politicians’ pronouncements and debate behavior 
will benefit politicians themselves, speculating about their underlying strategy and 
on how given voter segments or political factions will respond. This ‘strategic’ 
framing (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997) represents a prevailing, while often implicit, 
view that politicians are motivated, mainly or exclusively, by a desire to strengthen 
or consolidate of power. In the strategic framing, politicians try to do by pleasing 
other politicians and mainly by pleasing the voters, or certain segments of voters. To 
counterbalance this trend I suggest that argumentation scholars should come 
forward in the public sphere and assess to what extent politicians’ contributions to 
the debate are useful citizens.  
 To do this, we need norms. What must political debates and debaters deliver 
to meet citizens’ needs?  
My starting point is that political debate should function as citizens’ basis for 
making choices. It should help us estimate what problems we face, what ought to be 
done about them, and who has the best approach. Debates should help each one of 
us take a stand on what should be done - before it is done. In short, public debate 
should be deliberative to help us citizens deliberate. 
The political theorist Robert Goodin has referred to this stand-taking by 
citizens as “deliberation within” (2000). Simone Chambers, another political 
theorist, agrees that deliberation is central to democracy, but insists that “the mass 
public can never be deliberative” in the active sense of the word, i.e., we shall never 
see all the members of the mass public engage in deliberative debate with each 
other. However, the public rhetoric we hear, mainly through the media, does have a 
potential for providing deliberation to serve deliberating citizens’ needs - but only a 
potential. Most public rhetoric is what Chambers calls “plebiscitary,” based on 
pandering and manipulation. So scholars should critically assess public rhetoric, and 
the media that provides it, in hopes of “making the mass public more rather than 
less deliberative.” She says: “If rhetoric in general is the study of how speech affects 
an audience then deliberative rhetoric must be about the way speech induces 
deliberation in the sense of inducing considered reflection about a future action” 
(2009, p. 335). 
I agree with Goodin and Chambers that we need public political debate that is 
deliberative, not plebiscitary, mainly in order that we citizens may be optimally 
prepared for “deliberation within.” This is the normative basis on which I build a 
categorization of argumentative virtues and vices, intending it to be simple and 
useful. 
The cardinal virtues, in brief, are these: First, debaters who seek our 
adherence should do so by explicitly offering arguments, rather than trying to gain it 
with strategies that bypass arguments. Second, the arguments should withstand 
critical scrutiny by criteria to which I will return. Third, debaters should provide 
answers to counterarguments and criticisms from opponents or questioners. 
The typology of argumentative vices I propose is a mirror image of this triad. 
The first major category of vices comprises strategies by which our adherence to 
policies is sought without any arguments being given. In the second category, 
arguments are offered, but they are deficient or useless from a citizen’s point of 
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view. The third category comprises ways in which responses to criticism or 
counterarguments may be lacking or deficient.  
 
3.  VICES, TYPE I: NO ARGUMENTS 
 
First, a look at some strategies by which politicians try to win voters’ adherence to 
policies without providing argumentation. In my critical work with political debate, 
most explicitly in my book in Danish for a general audience De svarer ikke (‘They 
Don’t Answer,’ 2011; 2nd ed. 2013) I discuss some related ways of presenting 
questionable ideas for the hearer's acceptance without making it explicit that this is 
what one is doing, i.e., without asserting them or arguing for them. Because the 
ideas have not been asserted, the chances are that hearers will accept them 
unreflectingly and without asking for arguments.  
The range of linguistic features that can work like this includes such 
phenomena as 1) Orwellian "Newspeak," i.e., words and expressions "intended to 
impose a desirable mental attitude upon the person using them," as Orwell explains 
(1949); p. 2) “framing” language as discussed by, among others, George Lakoff 
(1996, 2004); for example the term death tax for estate tax; 3) ‘illicit’ use of 
presuppositions (Harder & Kock, 1976). Presuppositions are assumptions tied to 
words and expressions which are taken for granted even if the sentence in which 
they occur is negated or turned into a question. In the standard case, such 
assumptions should be shared by the speaker and the hearer; the illicit use of them 
occurs when a speaker introduces presuppositions not shared by the hearers, 
perhaps aiming to get the hearer’s unreflecting acceptance of them.  
I will discuss a fourth phenomenon: implicatures – ideas that hearers 
understand and derive from an utterance, often involuntarily, although they are not 
asserted in it. Linguists, following Grice (1975), tend to distinguish between two 
types: conventional implicatures, which attach to a statement whenever it is uttered, 
regardless of context; and conversational implicatures, which hearers derive from a 
statement as a function of its specific context.  
Consider this passage from George W. Bush’s “State of the Union” speech on 
Jan. 28, 2003. 
 
Before September the 11th, many in the world believed that Saddam Hussein could 
be contained. But chemical agents, lethal viruses and shadowy terrorist networks 
are not easily contained.  
 
In the first sentence, why is it relevant to say, in the past tense, that many believed 
Saddam could be contained? The most obvious reason would be that now people no 
more believe this. That may also provide relevance to the phrase Before September 
the 11th. Ostensibly, that way the day people gave up their former belief – for if they 
had kept it even after September 11, it would be irrelevant to specify the date. But if 
precisely that date refuted the belief that we can contain Saddam, then the most 
obvious reason for that would be that Saddam was partly or fully responsible for 
what happened that day. (There might be other reasons, and Bush did have another, 
much more convoluted reason in mind, but this is certainly the most obvious one.) 
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Perelman and others have reminded us that what we call ‘style’ is an integral 
part of argumentation. A great merit of Jeanne Fahnestock’s Rhetorical Style (2011) 
is to have shown this in detail. For example, in her chapter about ‘interclausal 
relations’ she demonstrates how rhetors can call on readers’ or hearers’ discourse 
knowledge, a knowledge of the kinds of meaning relations that can exist between 
clauses (p. 356). This may cause listeners’ minds to act involuntarily, constructing 
possible links between the parts of an utterance. 
Now consider both sentences of the above quote together. This likely causes 
more implicatures to arise, most obviously that Saddam had chemical agents, lethal 
viruses and shadowy terrorist networks, and that these were involved in 9/11. 
Otherwise the second sentence would be irrelevant to the first.  
Many similar examples from the second Bush administration’s rhetoric on 
Iraq could be cited. The point is that the use of implicatures is one of a range of 
devices by which politicians may transfer questionable beliefs to citizens without 
explicitly giving arguments. 
 
4. VICES, TYPE II: DEFICIENT ARGUMENTS 
 
Now for the second main category of argumentative vices. If arguments are in fact 
given, what criteria should they meet? Taking the reverse view, what can be wrong 
with them? 
I start with the observation that there are usually ‘good’ arguments both for 
and against a particular policy. 
From this it follows that a good argument is not what logicians call a ‘valid’ 
argument. Many textbooks still cling to ‘validity,’ defining a ‘valid’ argument as one 
where the truth of the conclusion necessarily follows from the truth of the 
arguments (‘premises’). When this is so, we speak of ‘deductive reasoning,’ 
‘entailment,’ or ‘demonstration.’ But to Chaïm Perelman (Perelman & Olbrechts-
Tyteca, 1958), ‘argumentation’ is reasoning where demonstration is precisely not 
attainable; and argumentation thus defined is ‘the realm of rhetoric.’ Similarly, it is a 
defining feature of ‘Informal Logic’ that it looks at how argumentation can be 
reasonable without being deductively valid.  
Is the validity criterion any use to us, then? Yes, it is of some use, because we 
often hear debaters pretend, explicitly or implicitly, that their arguments for a 
proposal entail an adoption of that proposal. Such false pretences should be 
exposed. In politics, the logical yardstick of deductive validity has this, rather 
limited, use. Where policies and decisions are concerned, we are dealing with what 
many philosophers, citing Aristotle, call practical reasoning; here I claim that there 
is never, in principle, any deductive entailment from the arguments for a proposal to 
the adoption of it. Although there are good arguments for it, there are, as a rule, also 
good arguments against it. As the philosopher Anthony Kenny has it, “if a project or 
proposal or decision is good, that does not exclude its being also, from another point 
of view, bad” (1979, p. 146). Hence we cannot blame debaters for not presenting 
arguments which entail their proposal; we can, however, blame them if they will 
make us believe that they do.  
CHRISTIAN KOCK 
5 
Add to this that for any problem one would like to do something about, there 
are often several alternative policies. Even if one of them is good, another might be 
better.  
All in all, assessing argument merit is much more complicated in politics, and 
in practical reasoning generally, than in logic. This is so not just in practice, but also 
in theory. So how can we go about it? 
Building on ‘Informal Logicians’ such as Johnson & Blair (2006), Blair (2012), 
Johnson (2000), and Govier (1987, 2010), I would posit the following three 




3) Weighty  
 
Accurate means that one can answer ‘Yes’ to the question, ‘Is that so?’ I prefer 
the term ‘accurate’ to the Informal Logicians’ preferred term ‘acceptable’ because 
‘accurate’ refers more to the relation between statements and reality, whereas 
‘acceptable’ refers more to the relation between statements and hearers.  
This is the ground covered by fact-checking organizations like the websites 
Factcheck.org or Politifact.com. Political debate abounds with alleged facts and 
statistics that should not go unchecked.  
It is important that outright falsity is not the only vice here. Accountants and 
lawyers use the expression 'true and fair.' This means that alleged facts and 
numbers provide a good and trustworthy account of how things are - not just that 
the numbers, taken in isolation, are ‘true,’ but that we get a full picture.  
Further, terms used in such information must, as Jamieson & Waldman 
(2002) have discussed, have a clear definition - and one that tallies with how the 
same terms are used by other debaters and understood by the public. But loose and 
idiosyncratic use of terms is one major vice in political debate; I suggest calling it 
‘fuzzy facts.’ 
Another major vice, one degree worse, is what we may call ‘fudging facts’: 
‘factual’ information which is not downright false but which distorts by inviting us 
to believe falsehoods. We have just seen how deftly worded communication can 
invite people to believe things that aren’t so. 
The rampant use of fuzzy and fudging facts makes much public debate 
useless for citizens. That is why Daniel Patrick Moynihan famously said: “Everyone 
is entitled to their own views, but not to their own facts.”  
Relevant: relevance concerns the relation between arguments and their 
warrants, whether these be explicit or implicit, as they often are. Problems arise in 
two kinds of situations: when an argument is not in fact covered or subsumed by the 
warrant it depends on; and when the warrant it depends on is one that the hearers 
cannot endorse.  
The warrants appealed to in practical argumentation will often be value 
concepts and ideological positions endorsed by the debater, but not by his 
opponents or hearers. Warrants are often differentially recognized by different 
individuals. It is a fact that the Falkland Islanders have voted overwhelmingly for 
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staying British, but Argentina does not recognize popular majority as a warrant and 
instead bases her claim for the islands on a territorial warrant – which in turn is not 
recognized by Britain. This example makes it clear that relevance appraisal in 
argumentation, more than the assessment of factual accuracy, allows for a certain 
amount of disagreement, even deep disagreement, and if you prefer, subjectivity. 
The insight that underlying values are sometimes not shared should also tell 
us that if we want to influence our opponents’ views, we should search for values on 
even deeper levels that we do share with them. The principle that there has to be 
this sort of common ground is central to Perelman’s concept of argumentation. 
Ideally, we should expect debaters on public issues to base their case on warrants 
that are shared by every member of the public. And a corresponding vice is to base 
one’s case on values and other warrants that are only shared by a narrowly targeted 
faction. We should expect public argumentation that does not simply pander to the 
pre-existing policy preferences of selected segments, but which tries to change some 
people’s policy preferences by appealing to underlying shared warrants. 
Whether an argument is covered by a warrant is often a matter of 
interpretation. Everyone agrees that killing innocent human beings is wrong, but 
does this notion cover abortion? We need debates in which debaters recognize that 
their disagreement with opponents is not necessarily a disagreement over deeply 
held values, but a difference in the interpretation of those values (Warnke, 1999).  
Coming back to what we actually get, a rampant relevance-related vice that is 
objectively and unconditionally vicious is argumentation directed at ‘straw men,’ i.e., 
distorted versions of opponents’ standpoints or of their arguments (these are two 
different things). A straw man version of an opponent’s standpoint tends to 
radicalize and transmogrify it into a caricature that is easy to reject; we may call it a 
‘detestable straw man.’ While a ‘straw’ version of one’s opponent’s standpoint may 
well be detestable, however, there is no warrant for concluding from this that one’s 
opponent’s real standpoint is detestable too. As for straw versions of an opponent’s 
arguments, these are routinely weakened and emasculated into something we might 
call ‘pitiable straw men.’  
Another relevance-related vice which is perhaps not quite so objectively and 
unconditionally wrong is the ascription of sinister ulterior motives to opponents. 
The possible presence of such motives has at most marginal relevance. There are 
accuracy problems as well – how can we know whether an opponent really has the 
hidden motives ascribed to him if they are hidden? Even if it is shown that some of 
those who advance a proposal do have hidden motives, should the proposal not be 
judged on what it actually does, rather than what someone intended it to do? 
Even if an argument is clearly relevant, and factually accurate too, our 
argument appraisal is not done. As we have seen, the warrants for arguments in 
political debate are typically value concepts; but a policy might be good according to 
one relevant value, for example that one should keep one’s promises – and at the 
same time bad according to another relevant value, for example economic prudence. 
A government may have made pre-election promises to implement certain policies – 
but doing so turns out to be enormously expensive. Many citizens in such a case 
would probably feel that both these warrants have relevance, so the task for citizens 
engaged in ‘deliberation within’ would be to prioritize. That would be each citizen’s 
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personal responsibility, since there is no pre-ordained or intersubjective way to 
determine whether the ethics of promises or economic prudence has more weight in 
a particular case.  
This shows that relevant warrants in practical argumentation are typically 
multiple (Kock, 2006); that they can easily conflict (Stocker, 1990); and that they are 
often not commensurable (Raz, 1998) in any agreed and pre-ordained way. 
As you may have noticed, the weight criterion just popped up. In choosing the 
term ‘weight’ I deviate from the term preferred by Informal Logicians such as 
Anthony Blair: “sufficiency.” The problem is that sufficiency is dichotomous. A 
quantity is either sufficient for some purpose, or it isn’t; it cannot be ‘rather 
sufficient.’ Do I have sufficient time to catch my plane? I cannot catch my plane ‘to 
some extent.’ Sufficiency is known in mathematics in phrases like ‘the necessary and 
sufficient condition.’ A condition is sufficient for something to be the case if that 
something necessarily follows; that is, deductive inference obtains. Informal 
logicians rightly want to abandon deductive inference as a necessary criterion of 
good argumentation; but if they include ‘sufficiency’ in their criteria, then either 
deductive inference is again required – or it has some other meaning which is fuzzy 
and idiosyncratic. 
Furthermore, the weight of an argument is of a peculiar, metaphorical kind 
because one cannot assess it for one argument taken by itself; one has to look at it in 
relation to the other good arguments on the same issue – and there are usually 
several on both sides. So weight means relative weight. All the arguments on both 
sides are in play when we want to ‘weigh’ an argument. 
This metaphorical ‘weighing’ of arguments against each other will be 
additionally complicated by the presence of the elements of individuality or 
‘subjectivity.’ As I have shown, these complications arise in regard to the recognition 
and the interpretation of warrants, and they arise even more when arguments are to 
be prioritized or ‘weighed.’ 
That is because, for one thing, arguments have warrants belonging to 
different dimensions (Kock, 2006). Should the economic argument that cutbacks are 
(perhaps) prudent trump the moral argument that promises to the contrary were 
made? There is no objective or ‘philosophical’ answer, so citizens must try to decide 
for themselves. But before they do, they need all the help they can get. And this kind 
of help they should expect from public debaters – as well as from journalists, 
pundits and academics in the public sphere. They need to hear the good arguments 
on both sides, and to be able to weigh them against each other they especially need 
debaters on each side to hear and then answer arguments from the other side. 
 
4.  VICES, TYPE III: NO ANSWERS 
 
This brings us to our last category of vices. Flouting the ‘dialectical obligation’ 
(Johnson, 1996, 2000, 2002; Kock, 2007) to sincerely hear and answer 
counterarguments or critical questions is perhaps the chief vice that makes public 
debate near useless for citizens. There is reason to believe that a great deal of what 
communication consultants do for the politicians they serve is teach them how to 
appear to answer counterarguments and critical questions, but which in reality 
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bypass them. Not every response is an answer. The obligation to answer can in 
principle only be satisfied in two ways:  
 
1) Either one tries to show why the counterargument is deficient 
– i.e., that it is either inaccurate or irrelevant, or both.  
2) Or if the counterargument happens to fulfil the accuracy and 
relevance conditions, as it often does, then one explains why 
one still sees the arguments for one’s own position as weightier 
than the arguments against it. 
 
These two kinds of behavior are rarely found in public debate. Instead we get 
responses in which counterarguments are either bypassed in silence, distorted into 
pitiable straw men, or blankly dismissed, i.e., without any reasons being offered for 
the dismissal. These vices are often camouflaged with repetitions of stale talking 
points, or talk about other subjects, including ‘straw’ versions of opponents’ views 
and denunciation of their hidden motives. 
It is the discussion of arguments pro and con, as in 1) and 2), that constitutes 
true deliberation. This is the kind of input that will most help citizens and voters 
engage in ‘deliberation within.’ It will help them muster the available arguments on 
both sides, what the issue involves, what arguments pertain to it, which arguments 
are accurate and relevant, and what the other party has to say in answer to them.  
That kind of deliberation will not result in universal consensus; there are 
reasons why we have such a thing as ‘reasonable disagreement’ (Rawls, 1989, 
1993). Perhaps there will not be many people who change their views. Even so, it 
will probably still be the case that a citizen who engages in ‘deliberation within’ will 
realize that other citizens who prefer other policies than he does may have reasons 
to do so which might make him wiser. He may understand that their reasons may 
say something about reality that he has not yet thought about, but which may be 
accurate and relevant, and which may even have some weight. Such an insight does 
not entail that our citizen should necessarily endorse his opponents’ preferred 
policies. As we saw at first, that kind of entailment has no place in practical 
reasoning. This implies that we should not be afraid to admit that our opponents 
may have some points that we have not yet given enough thought. In other words, 
even though we may never agree on divisive issues, it might do us good to sit down 
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